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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

vested right in a particular use of government property and therefore
denied Barnhill's regulatory takings claim.
When addressing the equal protection claim, the court held that
an equal protection claim is actionable if a municipality intentionally
enforced a law discriminatorily. The court held the municipality did
not enforce this ordinance discriminatorily. The ordinance survived
all of Barnhill's challenges.
Amy W Beatie

TEXAS
Brainard v. State, No. 98-0578, 1999 WL 795545 (Tex. Oct. 7, 1999)
(holding that the doctrines of riparian ownership, such as accretion,
reliction, and erosion, apply to changes in a river's course due to
artificial as well as natural causes for deciding boundary disputes).
In 1962, the United States Bureau of Reclamation constructed the
Sanford Dam on the Canadian River to create a water supply for city
members and to provide regional flood controls. Three years after the
dam's completion, the Canadian River Municipal Water Authority
("CRMWA"), a state agency, took control of the dam. The dam
reduced the flow of river water and encouraged more vegetation in the
river's former riverbed.
Twenty years later, in 1985, the General Land Office ("GLO")
announced its intention to determine the historical gradient line prior
to the artificial changes caused by the dam. In 1987, the GLO sent a
position paper to the people who owned land along the river
("Landowners"), claiming the former streambed was the State's
property. The GLO's artificial change theory asserted that surveyors
marking the gradient boundary of the river need not consider
conditions on a river influenced by human activity, like the Sanford
Dam's construction. The Landowners disagreed with the State's
position. Although both parties agreed that the Landowners were
riparian owners and that the State owned the bed of the Canadian
River, each party sought a judicial declaration of the boundary
between the State's riverbed and Landowner's riparian tracts. The
parties also agreed that the gradient boundary methodology would
determine the line between public and private ownership along the
banks of a navigable stream.
The Landowners sued the State and the GLO to establish the
boundary of the Canadian River. Both parties filed motions for
summary judgment asking the trial court to rule on the correct survey
to mark the boundary. The GLO asked for a ruling based on the
artificial change theory, and the Landowners asked for the court to
consider the present conditions. The trial court rejected the State's
artificial change theory as a matter of law. The court held that the
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Landowners were entitled to the riparian land established by the
survey done under present conditions of the Canadian River, and not
as of a date before the Sanford Dam was built. The trial court awarded
the Landowners attorney's and surveyor's fees and found the State and
GLO actions unreasonable under the Frivolous Claims Act.
The Court of Appeals reversed the part of the judgment decreeing
Landowners' recovery of attorney's and surveyor's fees. It also held
that the trial court erred by holding the State's survey inadmissible.
The Court of Appeals thus reversed the summary judgment and
remanded for a factual determination of the correct gradient
boundary. Both parties filed petitions for review.
The Texas Supreme Court reinstated, in part, the trial court's
judgment declaring that the Landowners' survey correctly marked the
boundary between the State's riverbed and the riparian tracts. The
court held that determining which survey used the correct
methodology to mark the boundary was a question of law, not a
question of fact. Instead, the validity of the parties' conflicting surveys
required a determination of the validity of the artificial change theory
in light of: (1) the accepted method for determining the boundary
between state riverbed and riparian land; and (2) the traditional rules
of riparian ownership. Because the parties already agreed on the
gradient methodology, the Court determined the general rules of
riparian ownership.
The court followed the accepted rule in Texas that when the
margin or bed of a body of water that is the boundary of a tract of land
is gradually and imperceptibly changed or shifted by accretion,
reliction, or erosion, the margin or bed of the body of water, as so
changed, remains the boundary line of tract. Accretion is the process
of increasing real estate by the gradual and imperceptible disposition
by water of solid material, through the operation of natural causes so
as to cause that formerly submerged land to become dry. Accretion by
reliction is the gradual addition made to land by a recession of the
water, as when the water shrinks below the usual watermark.
The court also determined that the riparian rights to additions by
accretion or reliction were vested property rights. In addition, the
court made no distinction between naturally and artificially created
gains and losses to riparian land due to accretion, reliction, and
erosion. However, the court noted that if the riparian owner caused
the accretion herself or directly participated in the accretion, the
owner lost her rights to the accreted land. The court rejected the
artificial change theory in the context of an artificial structure that
merely affected the current or flow of a river so as to cause artificial
accretion. The court also rejected the State's argument that the
doctrine of avulsion applied to the changes created by the Sanford
Dam and did not to alter the boundary of the Canadian Riverbed.
The court next determined which survey established the boundary
as a matter of law. Since the State's survey did not reflect changes in
the Canadian River that occurred after the closing of the dam, it did
not represent a present-day survey. The court therefore rejected the
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State's survey. The court instead relied on the Landowners' survey,
which comported with the gradient boundary methodology, to serve as
the correct marker.
In addressing attorney's fees, the court rejected the Landowners'
characterization that the suit was a boundary dispute and a declaratory
judgment action. Instead, the court held the legislative resolution
authorizing the suit did not entitle Landowners' recovery of attorney's
fees. Finally, the court found the Frivolous Claims Act did not apply.
Because the State's defense to the boundary dispute demonstrated an
arguable basis for the claim, the court found it was not frivolous.
M. Elizabeth Lokey

City of Saginaw v. Carter, 996 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that the City of Saginaw cannot claim sovereign immunity to deny
jurisdiction to a claimant pleading an intentional taking and
intentional nuisance by the City's operation of street and storm sewers
resulting in intentional flooding of claimant's property).
An increased volume and velocity of diverted surface water
allegedly caused by the City of Saginaw's ("City") operations resulted
in erosion, destruction, and endangerment to human lives on the
Carter property. The Carters alleged the City caused intentional
flooding of the property by their operation, control, and maintenance
of street and storm sewers. The Carters asserted two claims: (1)
intentional taking under Article I, § 17 of the Texas Constitution; and
(2) intentional nuisance.
The City filed a plea arguing the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the
City's plea. The City brought an interlocutory appeal alleging
erroneous denial.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the plea. A
governmental entity cannot use sovereign immunity to end a suit on
jurisdictional grounds without a showing of fraudulent pleading to
confer jurisdiction by the plaintiff. The City did not show fraudulent
pleading by Carter. The pleading alleged intentional acts and,
therefore, did not lack jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity, as it
would if it were a claim for negligent performance of governmental
functions. The court also reported summary judgment was the proper
avenue if the City believed Carter did not tender sufficient facts to
show intentional acts.
Tiffany Turner

